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ARBITRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
EDWARD BRUNET*
Traditionally, constitutional rights have been unavailable in
arbitration proceedings. Classical arbitration theory, in an effort
to preserve the speed, informality, and finality of arbitration,
posits that parties to arbitration have expressly opted out of the
judicial system, including its constitutional protections. Further-
more, many feel that since arbitration lacks state action, arbitra-
tion proceedings do not invoke constitutional rights. In this
article, Professor Edward Brunet examines the current status of
private arbitration and demonstrates the absence of constitu-
tional rights. Professor Brunet argues, however, that the classical
defenses of this absence fail to account for the real world of arbi-
tration in which participants lack knowledge about arbitration
and do not realize the implications of their agreement to arbi-
trate. Professor Brunet looks to the language and purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and suggests that the Act contem-
plates the application of constitutional rights to arbitration. He
further contends that "industrial due process" as practiced by
labor arbitrators should serve as a model for incorporating no-
tions of fairness into all commercial arbitration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Are constitutional rights applicable to arbitration proceedings?
What seems a simple question yields paradoxically dissimilar answers.
According to classical arbitration theory, there is little or no role for
constitutional rights within an arbitration hearing. Arbitration repre-
sents an alternative to litigation and offers a forum where legal rights are
not guaranteed and, in a very real sense, are de-emphasized.1 The asser-
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D.,
University of Illinois; LL.M., University of Virginia. I wish to thank Henry Drummonds and
Marty Redish for their comments and Mary Williams for valuable research input.
1. E.g., Silverman v. Bemnor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308, 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266,
473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 779 (1984) (asserting that the arbitrator "may do justice as he sees it, apply-
ing his own sense of the law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making an award
reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement"); GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25:01 (1984) (stating that arbitrators are not compelled to
"'follow otherwise applicable law when deciding issues [sic] before them [sic] unless they are
commanded to do so by the terms of the arbitration agreement' ") (quoting University of
Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974)).
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tion of constitutional rights in arbitration hearings might undesirably
judicialize arbitration.2 Speed, informality, and finality are the claimed
advantages of arbitration which are preferred by some potential litigants
to the vexatious characteristics of litigation. Moreover, this classical the-
ory holds that parties who contract to arbitrate formally opt out of the
judicial system. According to this view, a private contract to arbitrate
represents a volitional forfeiture of legal rights, including constitutional
rights.' Freedom to contract incorporates the concept of a party's choice
to avoid litigation. Furthermore, the private covenant to arbitrate lacks
any real nexus to the state; this absence of "state action" precludes any
argument based on constitutional rights.'
The same question can yield a different answer. The civil rights ad-
vocate assumes that constitutional rights can be advanced and assessed in
any adjudicatory setting. Arbitration, while certainly a form of alternate
dispute resolution, nonetheless resembles traditional adjudication since it
involves adversary presentations of proof and reasoned argument to an
arbitrator.' According to this contrasting view, arbitration, like adminis-
trative agency adjudications, must respect constitutional rights. Since ar-
bitration awards are final and effectively cannot be judicially reviewed,'
an arbitration hearing may be the only forum where constitutional rights
can be addressed. Moreover, the agency analogy is useful because agen-
cies, like organizations sponsoring arbitration, were created to provide
expertise and speed, and to address dissatisfaction with conventional
2. See C. William Fletcher III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement
of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 454 (1987) ("The lack of the expensive
elements of litigation is what makes arbitration so attractive.").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 139-72.
5. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,
363-64 (1978); Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act" The Case for Reform, 4 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 157, 159 (1989) (In arbitration
the parties present "evidence and reasoned arguments to an arbitrator whose final decision
should be responsive to the dispute as presented.").
6. Arbitration awards are final. They may be vacated only rarely and under circum-
stances requiring a very high level of proof. Speidel, supra note 5, at 191-98. Courts will not
vacate arbitral awards because of an "error of law." See, &g., Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 993 (2d Cir. 1986). While some courts will invalidate an arbitrator's award that
is "in manifest disregard of the law," they require the error to appear on the face of the award.
See, eg., Greenfield v. Mosley, 201 Cal. App. 3d 735, 746, 247 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (1988).
Because arbitrators usually do not write opinions and their awards typically constitute simple
declarations of the final result, courts rarely vacate awards on "manifest disregard of the law"
grounds. See, eg., Sargeant v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (reversing a trial court's vacating of an arbitral order because a lump sum arbitra-
tion award cannot be rejected for lack of an explanation), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990).
In short, little judicial review of arbitral awards exists.
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court adjudication.' Pursuant to this "civil rights view," arguments that
arbitration participants have waived their constitutional rights are overly
broad in scope: Some parties who agree to arbitrate might never have
intended to relinquish precious constitutional rights.' Moreover, with
the explosive growth of arbitration into areas as diverse and unbalanced
as medical malpractice, automobile insurance, small business loans, and
opening of brokerage accounts, there exists a serious question whether
inexperienced signatories to arbitration clauses truly consent to arbitra-
tion with any measure of understanding about the legal rights concomi-
tant with such a proceeding.
This article examines the validity of these conflicting views of
whether constitutional rights exist in arbitration. The article concerns
only private arbitral hearings held pursuant to contract. Because bur-
geoning court-annexed arbitrations9 are beyond the scope of this topic,
the article contemplates a private contract to arbitrate signed by the arbi-
tral participants. The conflicting views of the role of constitutional rights
in arbitration are most relevant in so-called commercial arbitration but
are also important to the increasing amount of tort arbitration. This arti-
cle specifically addresses whether, and to what extent, constitutional ar-
guments can be heard within the arbitral forum and in the very limited
judicial review available to the arbitral parties.
This question is practical as well as theoretical. The applicability of
constitutional rights arises increasingly in arbitrations: a stockbroker
wants to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion at a customer-broker arbitration; an employee arbitrating a griev-
ance challenges an employer-required drug test as constitutionally infirm
7. BERNARD SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasizing "defer-
ence to the administrative expert" as an important aspect of administrative law).
8. Compare North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 25 (1970) (waiver of constitutional
rights must be after a "voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternate choices") with
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 512-63 (1981)
(reading existing civil cases concerning waiver of constitutional rights to permit relinquish-
ment of civil rights so long as contract law principles are followed).
9. See generally PATRICIA A. EBENER & DONNA R. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE (1985) (describing court-administered arbitration
programs in eleven federal district courts and sixteen states); A. Leo Levin, Court-Annexed
Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 538-39 (1983) (detailing use of court-annexed proce-
dures in federal and state courts). The term "court-annexed arbitration" may be a misnomer.
Court-annexed arbitration is normally not final; rather a litigant is required to "arbitrate" but
may have a full plenary trial if dissatisfied with the result of the arbitration. Since court-
annexed arbitrations lack finality, a principal feature of arbitration, it is confusing to think of
them as arbitration. In this sense, court-annexed arbitration resembles mediation where a par-
ticipant, unhappy with a mediated result, may go forward to a full trial. See Speidel, supra
note 5, at 160; Daoud A. Awad, Note, On Behalf of Mandatory Arbitration, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1039, 1044 (1984).
84 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
under the Fourth Amendment; or a participant in a construction arbitra-
tion argues that an arbitrator's bias violates due process of law.
Part I of this article explores and describes the current lack of defi-
nite constitutional rights in arbitration. Part II discusses the two princi-
pal justifications for denying constitutional rights in arbitral settings: the
express waiver of civil liberties by the arbitration participants and the
lack of state action in private arbitration. Part III examines sources
available to permit enhanced consideration of constitutional rights at ar-
bitrations and on review. It recommends changes in arbitration proce-
dure to assure that some degree of constitutional protection will be
present in the process.
II. THE PAST AND PRESENT: ROUTINE DENIAL OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN ARBITRATION
A. The Nature of Arbitration
Definitions of arbitration tend to be opaque. Good, clear definitions
require firm, rigid proscriptions. By contrast, modem "arbitration" re-
sists a neat definition because it arose as a reaction to the slow and rigid
system of substantive and procedural positivism that characterizes tradi-
tional litigation.
The reactive and informal nature of arbitration has created a variety
of differing arbitral procedures and types of arbitration. An arbitration
of an employee-employer grievance held pursuant to a collective bargain-
ing agreement can differ greatly from a commercial arbitration between
two small businesses or an international arbitration between two trading
partners. Recognizing that various types of arbitration employ different
procedures, one can identify important characteristics shared by most
arbitration hearings.
1. Private Proceedings
Most arbitrations are private. Privacy permeates the atmosphere of
arbitration and is often perceived by contracting parties as an advantage
over public litigation. 10 In addition to the private location of hearings,
10. See IAN R. MACNEIL, CoNTRAcTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS
1110 (2d ed. 1978) (characterizing "preservation of privacy" as an advantage of arbitration);
Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 849 (1961) (listing "de-
sire for privacy" as one of the "chief moving factors" underlying commercial arbitration);
Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Model for Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON
DLsp. REsOL. 1, 7 (1989) (discussing reduction in publicity associated with mediation and
other alternative processes); Comment, Pre-fearing Procedures in Labor Arbitration: A Propo-
sal for Reform, 43 U. PrIr. L. REv. 1109, 1110-11 (1982) (noting that arbitration provides
"the parties a degree of privacy unavailable in civil litigation").
1992] ARBITRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 85
the results of arbitration are also private; published opinions are rare.11
The typical arbitration concludes with a terse, non-explanatory written
award that is not disclosed to the public. In short, most arbitration re-
sults are essentially secret.
2. Subordination of Substantive Law
Arbitrators are not compelled to apply rules of substantive law. The
weight of authority permits an arbitrator to "do justice as he sees it" and
fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given
set of facts.12 Frequently, arbitration results in a compromise with no
clear winner and thus the arbitration award often makes neither party
happy.
Although it would be incorrect to say that substantive rules play no
role in the informal style of arbitration, arbitrators, unlike judges, are not
bound to use substantive law.13 This freedom from substantive rules
creates a milieu in which arbitrators can ignore the law when making
decisions. 4 The general failure of arbitrators to provide findings of fact
or explanations for their awards and the extremely narrow nature of judi-
cial review of arbitral awards contribute to the subordinate role of legal
rules in arbitration.
3. Informal Procedures
Informality is the hallmark of arbitral proceedings. Formal rules of
evidence are avoided by the sponsors of arbitration. 5 Instead, arbitra-
11. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 13 (1987); WILNER, supra note 1, § 29.06 ("Arbitrators are not required to state the
reasons for their award, and commercial arbitration awards, unlike labor awards, are rarely
accompanied by written opinions."). Labor arbitrations, where published opinions are the
norm, represent an important exception to unpublished arbitration results.
12. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that "arbitrators are not bound
by precedent"); In re Aimcee Wholesale Corp. (Tomar Products, Inc.), 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626,
237 N.E.2d 223, 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1968) (noting that "[a]rbitrators are not bound
by rules of law"); Fudicker v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 400 (1875) (com-
menting that arbitrators "disregard strict rules of law or evidence and decide according to their
sense of equity"). Both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1-15 (1988) and the
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955), are silent as to whether the arbitrator
must apply law when deciding a dispute.
13. For example, counsel, if present, may try an arbitration using substantive rules as a
guide, and many arbitrators regularly use substantive legal principles in crafting an award.
Mentschikoff, supra note 10, at 861.
14. See David E. Feller, Relationship of the Agreement to External Law, in LABOR ARBI-
TRATOR DEVELOPMENT 33 (Christopher A. Barreca et al. eds., 1983) (suggesting that a labor
arbitrator should not entertain formal claims of violations of statute).
15. WILNER, supra note 1, § 24.02 ("Arbitrators have discretionary power to admit and
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tors usually try to consider all evidence the arbitral participants desire to
submit.16 While some discovery may be possible in certain jurisdic-
tions,17 full litigation-style discovery is avoided in arbitration." Typi-
cally, the parties are largely free to create their own procedures and may
agree in advance to use a particular jurisdiction's rules of evidence. Such
an agreement, however, would be unusual since formal rules of evidence
generally are viewed as incompatible with the goal of a speedy and inex-
pensive resolution of the dispute.19
4. Finality
Arbitration results are essentially final.20 While there exists a se-
hear any evidence that the parties may wish to present through witnesses or documents.");
Robert Coulson, Appropriate Procedures for Receiving Proof in Commercial Arbitration, 71
DICK. L. REV. 63, 64-68 (1966) (noting that rules of evidence are not followed strictly in
arbitration); AMERICAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 31
(1984) ("conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary").
16. See MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBIrRATION 7
(2d ed. 1987) (describing arbitrators as accepting evidence "for what it may be worth"); JOHN
S. MURRAY, ALAN S. RAu & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DisPuTE RESOLUTION
557 (1989) ("[Ain arbitrator is in fact more likely to get into trouble by following the rules of
evidence than by ignoring them-and far more likely to get into trouble by excluding evidence
than by admitting it."); Clare B. McDermott, An Exercise in Dialectic: Should Arbitration
Behave as Does Litigation?, in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES 1, 14
(James L. Stern et a. eds., 1981) ("I am prepared to listen to just about anything a party wants
me to hear.").
17. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1283.05, 1283.1 (West 1982) (granting the au-
thority to "take depositions and to obtain discovery" in personal injury arbitration); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-10(b) (West 1987) (permitting oral depositions and document inspec-
tion within 60 days of demand for arbitration or order compelling arbitration); Stanton v.
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242-43 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding
that arbitrators have power to issue pre-hearing subpoena for the production of documents).
18. See, eg., Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980) (Selection of arbitration is
intentional rejection of "procedural niceties which are normally associated with a formal
trial."); John G. Malcolm & Eric J. Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REV. 725, 756
(1986) (commenting that only limited discovery is available in arbitration of disputes between
securities investors and sellers).
19. WILNER, supra note 1, § 24:02 ("It is a well established principle of arbitration law
and practice that the usual common-law rules regarding the admission and rejection of evi-
dence are not strictly observed in arbitration."). Resolving evidentiary disputes is time con-
suming and inconsistent with the informal nature of arbitration.
20. International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial
y Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The whole point of arbitration is that
the merits of the dispute will not be reviewed in the courts."); Morris v. Zukerman, 69 Cal.2d
686, 691, 446 P.2d 1000, 1004, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880, 884 (1968) ("neither the merits of the contro-
versy nor the sufficiency of the evidence ... are matters for judicial review"); In re Aimcee
Wholesale Corp. (Tomar Products, Inc.), 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626, 237 N.E.2d 223, 225, 289
N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1968) ("[a]rbitrators are not bound by rules of law and their decisions are
essentially final"); WILNER, supra note 1, § 34:00 (arbitrator's award "will not be reviewed by
1992] ARBITRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 87
verely limited form of judicial reyiew following arbitration,21 there is no
true appeal from an arbitral award. Judicial review is not available to
arbitration signatories because they seek a fair, informal, and prompt re-
sult without the delays associated with a formalized appeal system. As
expressed by Professor Richard Speidel, finality is a "core ingredient" of
arbitration that "supposedly gives arbitration an advantage over
litigation. '2
2
A party dissatisfied with an arbitral result may seek to have the
award judicially vacated or modified on limited grounds. For example,
clear fraud by the arbitrator may cause an award to be vacated.23 Simi-
larly, judicial designation of an award as inconsistent with public policy
constitutes a severely limited avenue of review.2' Nevertheless, the
chances of overturning an arbitral award are slim. 25  Courts have con-
strued these methods of review narrowly in order to preserve the finality
of arbitration.
Although earlier cases set aside an arbitral award if it was in "mani-
fest disregard of the law,"'26 more recent cases appear to limit review of
the court since his decision on issues of fact and law has been agreed by the parties as final and
binding upon them").
21. See infra text accompanying notes 173-87.
22. Speidel, supra note 5, at 191; see also George L. Blum, Disclosing Conflict of Interest in
the California Arbitration System: Bainwait v. Herandez and the Erosion of Duty, 5 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 97, 97 (1989) (opining that arbitral forum should be as "final as possible").
23. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988) (providing that arbitral awards can be set aside or vacated
because of "fraud, corruption or undue means"); Bonan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835
F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that in order to vacate an arbitration award "the
movant must establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence" and demonstrate that the re-
sult of the arbitration hearing would have been different but for the fraud); cf. Lofarge Conseils
Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986)
(movant seeking to set aside award on ground of fraud must show fraud to have been discover-
able prior to or during arbitration).
24. Eg., Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir.), (re-
versing trial court's refusal to enforce arbitral award because result contrary to public policy),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees
Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.) (reversing trial court order vacating an arbitration award
on grounds of "workplace safety" and reinstating employee who suffered a nervous breakdown
and was hospitalized after attacking fellow employees and damaging employer property), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986); Union Employers Div. of Printing Indus. v. Columbia Typo-
graphical Union No. 101, 353 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (D.D.C. 1973) (restricting "public policy"
ground of review to narrow situation where award "compels the violation of law or conduct
contrary to accepted public policy"), aff'd, 492 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25. See generally A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that "federal court review of arbitration awards is extremely limited");
Antwine v. Prudential Bache See., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990) ("judicial review of
an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow"); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas
Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.) (requiring judicial review of arbitration to be
"narrowly limited"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Speidel, supra note 5, at 191-98.
26. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
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an arbitrator's substantive decision. Refusals to overturn awards because
of mere "error[s] of law" are now the norm. 27 The typical lack of a
written opinion in commercial arbitration facilitates this development.
Courts cannot easily review inscrutable awards lacking explanation and,
therefore, often refuse to overturn arbitration awards that fail to supply a
rationale.2" This development has led Professor Speidel to state that "if
the arbitrator does not prepare a written opinion, the applicable law can-
not be delineated and analyzed.
29
5. Expertise and Lack of Jury
Arbitrators are often said to be experts in the subject matter of the
disputes they adjudicate. Certainly this was true of the historic commer-
cial arbitrations between textile merchants. The merchants would select
an expert in their particular trade to hear and decide their dispute. The
growth of private arbitration, however, has produced such a demand for
experts that there is reason to doubt modem arbitration expertise.30
An expert arbitrator is a substitute for the jury. Lack of a jury trial
is a significant feature of arbitration and is valued by some business par-
ties who generally are disadvantaged by jury trials.
B. Arbitration in Action: A Lack of Firm Constitutional Rights
At present there is little guarantee that constitutional arguments are
useful in commercial arbitration proceedings. Probably the biggest im-
pediment to enforcing constitutional rights is arbitration's tendency to
de-emphasize substantive rights. Because arbitrators are not constrained
by legal rules, constitutional protections have little or no impact within
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); French v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
27. See, e.g., Rostad & Rostad Corp. v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 923
F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1991) (asserting that there is "some doubt" whether manifest disregard
of the law is still a basis for vacating arbitral awards); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting vacation of arbitral awards because
of mere "error of law" and narrowing "manifest disregard" review to rare situations where the
arbitrator "appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore
or pay no attention to it").
28. See, eg., Sargeant v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 532-33
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing trial court's vacating of an arbitral order because a lump sum
arbitration award cannot be rejected for lack of supporting explanation), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1028 (1990).
29. Speidel, supra note 5, at 198.
30. Arbitrators can easily be appointed to panels merely by filing forms listing their expe-
rience. While arbitral organizations, in theory, review these forms for legitimacy, no thorough
assessment or test of the arbitrator's knowledge of the substantive law of the specialty area is
conducted. Today's arbitrator often may not be an expert.
[Vol. 71
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an arbitration proceeding. An arbitrator may listen to an argument that
a constitutional right has been breached, but will not be required to apply
any aspect of substantive law, including civil liberties, to remedy that
breach.
The informal process of arbitration prevents careful study of the
treatment of constitutional rights in arbitral proceedings. Most commer-
cial arbitrations conclude only with an award and no opinion revealing
the rationale or findings for the result. This process frustrates identifica-
tion of the assertion and disposition of civil liberties arguments. Civil
liberties issues within arbitration are invisible except in those rare in-
stances where a party raises constitutional rights as the ground for set-
ting aside an arbitral award and the court writes an opinion somehow
discussing the constitutional question within the typically inscrutable ar-
bitration result.
A more thorough study of the interplay between constitutional
rights and arbitration, however, is possible through examination of the
issue in labor arbitration. The customary practice of labor arbitrators is
to write opinions explaining their awards. These written opinions pro-
vide a unique opportunity for insight not available in most other types of
arbitration.
Examination of the status of constitutional rights within labor arbi-
tration is particularly appropriate because the field of labor arbitration
has played an important role in the growth of arbitration. Arbitration of
employee-employer grievances before labor arbitrators has a rich and
successful history and often is looked to as a model of dispute resolu-
tion.31 Another reason to focus upon labor arbitration is the field's "rela-
tional contract"32 nature, which results from collective bargaining
agreements between parties with long-term relationships. Much of com-
mercial arbitration also involves relational contracts between parties with
ongoing business dealings. Accordingly, special attention must be given
to labor arbitration's treatment of constitutional rights.
1. The Ambiguous "Due Process" of Labor Arbitration
Assertions of violations of civil liberties are common in labor arbi-
tration hearings. An employee may question whether her employer can
suppress her right to free expression; an employer's program of random
31. See, ag., David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAL. L. REv. 663, 745-51 (1973).
32. See generally IAN R. MACNEILL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RE-
LATIONS 10-16, 210-13 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing transactional and relational contract struc-
tures and collective bargaining relationships).
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drug testing may be attacked as without probable cause; or application of
an employer's work rules without specific advance notice may be chal-
lenged as lacking appropriate due process notice protections.
The applicability of the various constitutional rights in a labor arbi-
tration hearing is uncertain. Arbitrators often assert that constitutional
arguments have no place in labor arbitration. More specifically, Robben
Fleming and Willard Wirtz have observed that the privilege against self-
incrimination has little role in a labor arbitration hearing.33 Professor
Edgar Jones cautions that automatic application of the constitutional
norms of criminal cases is misplaced in arbitration.34
Statements by leading academics that labor arbitrators need not ap-
ply constitutional rights should come as no surprise. While special fac-
tors such as the need for a stable, peaceful procedure to resolve multiple
grievances quickly help make labor arbitration particularly successful, 35
labor arbitration is nonetheless a type of arbitration where legal rights
have no definitive applicability. The procedural law of labor arbitration
mandates that the arbitrator's primary source of law is the arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 36  A labor arbitration
clause represents the signatories' choice "to be bound, not by decisions of
courts or other arbitrators in somewhat comparable matters, but by [the
arbitrator's] judgment as to how the case should be decided on the facts
in the record and the arguments advanced. '37
A few examples from written labor arbitration decisions illustrate
how arbitrators deal with civil liberty arguments. Arbitrators often re-
fuse to find a constitutional right not to incriminate oneself because the
33. ROBBEN W. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 182 (1965); Willard
Wirtz, Due Process ofArbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 11TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 19-20 (Jean T. Mc-
Kelvey ed., 1958).
34. Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Varia-
tions on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1286-90 (1966); see also OWEN FAIR-
WEATHER, FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 267-71
(Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991) ("[Mlost arbitrators find that the strictures that result
from too free borrowing of due process principles from criminal law are out of place in the
'shirt sleeves business of arbitration.' ").
35. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (holding
that labor arbitration was the quid pro quo for preventing work stoppages via "no strike"
clause).
36. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (stat-
ing that an arbitration award "is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement").
37. Peter Seitz, The Citation of Authority and Precedent in Arbitration (Its Use and
Abuse), ARB. J., Dec. 1983, at 58, 59; see also Carlton J. Snow, An Arbitrator's Use of Prece-
dent, 94 DICK. L. REv. 665, 666-70 (1990) (stating that arbitrators, not reviewing courts,
should decide precedential value of earlier arbitral awards).
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employee-grievant failed to provide information to his employer during
investigations of work-related conduct. When presented with a Fifth
Amendment argument, arbitrators have ruled that the constitution does
not prevent employee discipline even though it might protect an em-
ployee charged with criminal wrongdoing.38 Similarly, labor arbitrators
have drawn negative inferences from an employee's refusal to testify, 9
approved the discharge of an employee based upon a blood test adminis-
tered while the grievant was unconscious," and permitted searches of
employee property without Fourth Amendment protections."
While these decisions are consistent with the prevailing norm that
legal rights need not be adhered to by an arbitrator, labor arbitrators do
not systematically ignore assertions of constitutional rights. Indeed, la-
bor arbitrators claim to consider civil liberties by adhering to the doc-
trine of "due process of arbitration" or "industrial due process."'42
Pursuant to this doctrine, labor "disciplinary actions must conform to
procedural fairness."'4
To the outside observer this doctrine may seem somewhat amor-
phous. Rather than guaranteeing the regular and systematic application
of constitutional rights, "due process of arbitration" describes the atti-
tude and set of values of arbitrators. As such it is hardly positivist and
seems foreign to the usual safeguards of constitutional protection.
38. Illinois Power Co., 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 586, 590 (1985) (Penfield, Arb.) ("While
the Constitution protects an accused in criminal proceedings, it does not guarantee that an
employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment during the investigation of infractions of Com-
pany rules and policies will continue to be employed."); Fort Monroe Exch. & Nat'l. Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, Local R 4-11, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8358, at 4620 (1982) (Har-
kless, Arb.) (holding that constitutional rights are not violated by using failure to testify
against ex-employee because "privilege against self-incrimination applies in criminal cases and
is not ordinarily recognized in arbitration proceedings"); accord LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBrrRATION 4-26 (Tim Bornstein & Ann Gosline eds., 1992) ("a majority of arbitrators hold
that the Fifth Amendment... is not applicable to arbitration").
39. Brown Shoe Co., 16 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 461, 466 (1951) (Klamon, Arb.) (stating
that the employees' refusal to testify "abundantly sustains the Company's position").
40. New York Tel. Co., 76-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8420, at 6333 (1976) (Marko-
witz, Arb.).
41. See, eg., Aldens, Inc., 68-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8814, at 5823 (1968) (Kel-
liher, Arb.); cf. Lucky Stores, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1274, 1276 (1969) (Eaton, Arb.)
(holding no application of Fourth Amendment required in arbitration proceeding if no state
action).
42. See generally FAIRWEATHER, supra note 34, at 267 ("Most arbitrators endeavor to
give meaning and application in labor arbitration to the principles of 'due prccess' established
in the law of constitutional criminal procedure."); Robben Fleming, Some Problems of Due
Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. Rv. 235, 235-48 (1961) (tracing
development of an industrial due process concept and focusing upon issues of notice, avoid-
ance of surprise and confrontation).
43. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 61 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 443, 447 (1973) (Murphy, Arb.).
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Nonetheless, "industrial due process" is a fact of life in labor arbi-
tration. Examination of labor arbitration decisions demonstrates that
some measure of civil liberties protection is present in the arbitral process
by virtue of labor arbitrators' use of their unique brand of "due process
of arbitration."
In Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA,' an arbitrator used the
concept of labor arbitration due process to overturn the discharge of an
electrician and to order his return to work with full back pay, seniority,
and benefits. The grievant had been fired by the Goddard Space Flight
Center following his guilty plea and a suspended sentence for possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute. The arbitrator's reversal of the dis-
charge was premised upon the employer's failure to specify the charges
against the grievant and the sanctioning supervisor's use of a written in-
vestigative report that included statements obtained from a prison inter-
view with a convicted felon who had sold cocaine to the employee. The
arbitrator found that the grievant was "denied substantive and proce-
dural due process" because he was not "informed, in writing of the
charges against [him]" and because the written investigative report "bi-
ased" the sanctioning supervisor.4" It is significant and typical of "arbi-
tration due process" that the arbitrator concluded that the grievant "did
not enjoy . . . rudimentary features of due process in this case," but,
nonetheless, excluded any detailed reasoning as to why due process had
been denied.46
A similarly vague but effective use of "arbitration due process" oc-
curred in Red Wing Co.,'T in which an arbitrator overturned the demo-
tion of two employees. Management had questioned the employees
following customer complaints of finding a razor blade in the employer's
manufactured peanut butter, and the employer had argued that the disci-
plined employees had answered hypothetical questions in a way which
led the company to think they would fail to report product adulteration.
The arbitrator reversed the demotions because the employer had violated
"basic notions of fairness" by disciplining the grievants "without prior
notice either by work rule or warning" that their answers would cause
demotion.48 Here, as in Goddard, the arbitrator required a measure of
due process in the employment setting and, by doing so, incorporated the
assertion of civil liberties into the arbitration hearing.49 It is noteworthy
44. 89-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8038 (1988) (Berkeley, Arb.).
45. Id at 3189.
46. Id
47. 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCII) 8254 (1979) (Denson, Arb.).
48. Id. at 4055.
49. The arbitrator also applied a First Amendment constitutional-rights analysis by ex-
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that, unlike the Goddard arbitration, no state action was present in the
Red Wing arbitration. 0
A third example of industrial due process is City of Detroit."' The
arbitrator set aside a prison guard's suspension because the employer had
disciplined the employee before allowing him to give his own version of
the facts. The employee was suspended and given a written notice that
he was disciplined for "conduct unbecoming a city employee"; in fact,
the employer relied upon a report that the employee had permitted pris-
oners to engage in sexual activity and to consume alcoholic beverages.
The arbitrator reasoned that "industrial due process" required "that the
employee be advised promptly of the charges against him, in detail, and
be given an opportunity to explain his version of the story before disci-
pline is administered." 2
The precise role due process played in City of Detroit arbitration is
noteworthy and common in labor arbitration. The collective bargaining
agreement called for application of "just cause" in cases of employee dis-
cipline. The arbitrator reasoned that the "just cause" ' 3 language "neces-
sarily includes the concept of 'industrial due process.' "'I The arbitrator
also provided a helpful definition of arbitral due process:
In addition to a valid substantive basis, disciplinary actions
must conform to procedural fairness, sometimes referred to as
"industrial due process." This requires a full and fair investiga-
tion of the facts and circumstances surrounding the employee
conduct, and normally will include an opportunity for the em-
ployer [sic], before the Company makes its final decision, to
offer any denials, explanations or justifications which may be
relevant. It is a basic principle of fairness, in industrial disci-
pline as well as legal proceedings, that no one should be penal-
ized without opportunity to speak in his own behalf.5"
This language reveals the exact manner in which the City of Detroit arbi-
trator applied due process protections. One simple interpretation is that
the arbitrator did nothing more than apply the arbitral participants' con-
plicitly recognizing the employee's "freedom of expression," but then balancing this right
against the "clear and present danger to the safety of the consuming public." Id
50. See infra text accompanying notes 139-72.
51. 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8533 (1979) (Roumell, Arb.).
52. Id. at 5358.
53. A "just cause" provision of a collective bargaining agreement means that an employee
will not be disciplined without reason. Such clauses are typical in collective bargaining agree-
ments. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Em-
ployee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594-95.
54. City of Detroit, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8533, at 5358.
55. Id. (quoting United Tel. Co. of Fla., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 443 (1973) (Murphy, Arb.)).
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tractual choice to require "just cause" in disciplinary proceedings. Par-
ties to arbitration can, of course, dictate their own procedures by
specifying them in their contract to arbitrate. Perhaps nothing more
than the arbitrator's incorporation of rough constitutional principles oc-
curs in those "due process" labor arbitrations controlled by "just cause"
clauses.
This view implies that if the agreement provides for a grievance
hearing guided by "just cause" principles, the arbitrator may apply con-
stitutional norms because he believes the parties chose to be bound by
them. Professor St. Antoine characterized the arbitrator as a "contract
reader" charged by the contract signatories with the job of interpreting
the agreement.5 6 The arbitrator is the parties' "joint alter ego for the
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to han-
dle the unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement.""7 If interpret-
ing the collective bargaining agreement requires reference to external
law, the arbitrator may apply law. 8 In endorsing this theory, Judge
Harry Edwards requires that both the parties and the courts be "bound
by the arbitrator's interpretation without regard to whether a judge
would reach the same result if the matter were heard in court."5 9 The
implications of this theory are central to an overall understanding of la-
bor arbitration. Courts must respect the finality of the arbitrator's legal
interpretation so long as it derives its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement.6 This may require a court to confirm a labor arbitration
award that mistakenly interprets the law so long as the legal interpreta-
tion has a source in the contract itself.61
The vision of constitutional rights being applied by a "contract
reader" is reinforced by instances in which arbitrators specifically point
to the collective bargaining agreement as the ultimate source of their
ability to apply civil liberties. For example, one arbitrator overturned a
worker's discharge because of the employer's failure to allow the accused
employee and a union steward to investigate the scene of an alleged inci-
56. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MiCH. L. REv. 1137, 1138-44 (1977) (emphasizing
the role of the arbitrator as a "contract reader" designated by collective bargaining agreement
parties to resolve disputes using the terms and implications of the contract).
57. Id at 1140.
58. The parties' contract language may call for the application of legal principles, "either
expressly or impliedly." Id at 1143.
59. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
60. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
61. See American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 6 (stating that "[a]lleged 'mistake of
law' does not alter the standard of review").
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dent. The arbitrator reasoned that the worker had been denied his "con-
tract[] due process" rights to defend himself. 2 Similarly, another
arbitrator pointed to a "just cause" clause in a collective bargaining
agreement as the source of his ability to apply First Amendment freedom
of expression principles. These principles were used to overturn the pun-
ishment of a town employee who erroneously charged municipal employ-
ees with misappropriating town property. 3
Yet some labor arbitrators apply due process and other constitu-
tional rights without articulating any rationale and specifically without
reference to a "just cause" clause. In contrast, some courts refuse to
uphold awards based upon due process without a "just cause" clause in
the collective bargaining agreement.6r Such cases merit careful study.
They may represent little more than the freedom of an arbitrator to de-
cide disputes unhampered by substantive legal principles. They may re-
sult from the many non-lawyer arbitrators who are vaguely familiar with
legal principles but are not familiar with legal rules. Or such cases may
represent the arbitrator's application of industrial common law to the
practices of the industry.6
Nevertheless, loose application of constitutional safeguards in labor
arbitration has become so frequent that there may be a separate explana-
tion for this development. Application of "due process" in labor arbitra-
tion might be justified by an arbitrator's belief that such procedural
protection is necessary to make labor arbitration achieve its goal of labor
harmony. Successful arbitration of employee grievances facilitates peace-
ful and productive relations between labor and management.66 In this
sense, use of constitutional rules within labor arbitration appears to be
based on "relational contract" considerations because a long-term need
for peaceful resolution of disputes animates the matter. In addition, suc-
cessful labor arbitration creates a healthy environment for labor-manage-
ment governance because it provides a measure of independent problem-
62. International Salt Co., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8146, at 3618 (1985) (Kates,
Arb.).
63. Town of Plainville, 82-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8002, at 3016-21 (1981) (Sacks,
Arb.). See also Gougler Indus., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8360, at 4544-45 (1986)
(Duda, Arb.) (arbitrator relied on "due process" requirement in labor contract to overturn
employee discharge because of supervisor's refusal to discuss reason for discharge notice); Vil-
lage of Boubonnais, 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8362, 4502-03 (1985) (Hayford, Arb.)
(premising a "property interest" in seniority entirely on terminology within the collective bar-
gaining agreement).
64. See, e.g., Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union Local
261, 950 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1991) (overturning award based upon lack of notice and due
process because labor contract lacked just cause language).
65. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
66. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 53, at 610-11.
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solving for parties with long term relations.67 These factors support an
arbitrator's finding of a "just cause" concept in a collective bargaining
contract. 8
2. The Amorphous Status of Constitutional Rights
in Commercial Arbitration
Although the concept of "industrial due process" is ambiguous, the
status of constitutional rights in commercial arbitration is even more so.
The lack of written opinions in commercial arbitration frustrates careful
study of this subject. Also, because commercial arbitrators can ignore
substantive rules, they may refuse to recognize civil liberties.
Of course, in a given dispute, the arbitrator may decide to enforce a
constitutional right. No legal barrier prevents such action. Yet no pre-
vailing custom or theory supports the regular application of constitu-
tional rules in arbitration. Thus far no equivalent of labor arbitration's
"industrial due process" has arisen to support increased procedural pro-
tections in commercial arbitration. Accordingly, we find almost no guar-
antee of the application of civil liberties in commercial arbitration.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.69 repre-
sents the leading commercial arbitration case dealing with the applicabil-
ity of procedural rights during arbitration hearings. In Commonwealth
Coatings, a sharply divided Supreme Court permitted a construction ar-
bitration award to be set aside because the "neutral" arbitrator of a
three-member panel failed to disclose that he had been employed by a
contractor whose surety was a party to the arbitration. After the arbitra-
tors unanimously entered an award in favor of the prime contractor's
surety and against a subcontractor, facts emerged that the "neutral" arbi-
trator had received "about $12,000 [from the prime contractor] over a
period of four or five years, and [that] the relationship even went so far as
to include the rendering of services on the very projects involved in this
lawsuit."70 Justice Black, in a plurality opinion joined by three other
Justices, vacated the arbitration award because of Section 10 of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA) which permits courts to set aside awards
67. See St. Antoine, supra note 56, at 1138 ("[Ihe key to the special status of labor
arbitration is that it is an integral component of union and management's autonomous regula-
tion of their ongoing relationship.").
68. See Jean T. McKelvey, Discipline and Discharge, in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 88,
89 (Arnold M. Zack ed., 1984) (stating that some arbitrators imply a just cause concept in
labor arbitration despite lack of such a clause in the collective bargaining agreement).
69. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
70. Id at 146 (plurality opinion). The lawsuit referred to was the suit to set aside the
arbitration award.
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"procured by corruption, fraud or undue means" or "evident partiality
... in the arbitrators. 71 The plurality reasoned that the standards of
impartiality for arbitrators must be just as strict as those for judges be-
cause arbitrators "have completely free rein to decide the law as well as
the facts and are not subject to appellate review."172
In his dissent, Justice Fortas attacked the factual basis of Justice
Black's opinion because no party had claimed that the arbitrator in ques-
tion was actually biased. Justice Fortas reasoned that the "neutral" arbi-
trator had been guilty, at most, of an "innocent failure to volunteer
information. ' 73 The record showed that the "neutral" arbitrator was a
"respected consulting engineer who has performed services for 'most of
the contractors in Puerto Rico,' "I and that he was a friend of the attor-
ney for the losing arbitration participant. On this record, Justice Fortas
was unwilling to find that the "evident partiality" standard of the FAA
had been met.75
The concurring opinion of Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall,
signaled that the decision should not hold arbitrators to constitutionally-
premised judicial standards of bias and conceded that arbitrators' prior
relationships often would enhance their decision-making capacity.76
Nonetheless, Justice White found the arbitration tainted because of the
complete lack of "frankness at the outset" of the arbitration.77 This
pragmatic concurring opinion noticeably lacked any explanation of how
the targeted arbitrator's behavior violated the FAA's "undue means" or
"evident partiality" standard.
The Commonwealth Coatings decision is confusing. The Second
Circuit concluded that "much of Justice Black's opinion must be read as
dicta, and we are left in the dark as to whether an 'appearance of bias'
will suffice to meet the seemingly more stringent 'evident partiality' stan-
dard' 78 of the FAA. Commonwealth Coatings lacked the facts necessary
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
72. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149-50 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 152 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 152-53 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 153-54 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 150-52 (White, J., concurring). In contrast, the modem concept of an impartial
jury is based upon jurors with little or no personal knowledge of the parties or the subject
matter. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEoFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.13,
at 456 (3d ed. 1985) (stating that information regarding a prospective juror's knowledge of the
facts or parties "may be a ground for challenge"). The common-law concept of the jury was
similar to arbitration because "originally the jury was supposed to decide on the basis of its
members' own knowledge." Id. § 8.13, at 453.
77. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
78. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984). The Morelite decision crafted a "reasonable person" test for
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for the plurality to reach its seemingly "statutory construction" conclu-
sion that the FAA had been violated. Instead, Justice Black seemed to
premise a difficult statutory construction result on constitutional
grounds. Justice Black cited Tumey v. Ohio7 9 which held that the Due
Process Clause required the decision of a court to be set aside upon the
showing that a judge had the "slightest pecuniary interest" in the re-
sult.80 Justice Black argued that if the Constitution subjected courts to a
strict bias standard, it would be logical for the FAA to apply the "same
concept" in arbitration."1 Justice Black's analysis is difficult to reconcile
with the text of the FAA because, in effect, he reads a broad constitu-
tional doctrine into the FAA's more restrictive grounds for setting aside
arbitral awards. Although the Commonwealth Coatings plurality tried to
read constitutional due process into the arbitration procedure, three dis-
senters and two concurring judges ignored any constitutional principle or
authority. A majority of the Court refused to interject constitutional
rights into a commercial arbitration hearing.
Lower courts have struggled with the "less than clear standard" 2 of
Commonwealth Coatings. Some decisions refuse to hold arbitrators to
the same "appearance of bias" standard as judges,83 while others apply a
watered-down version of the constitutionally premised "appearance of
bias" test."4 Not surprisingly, no lower court case interprets Common-
wealth Coatings as mandating the application of constitutional due pro-
cess principles in arbitration proceedings.8 5
assessing partiality which is different from any approach taken by Commonwealth Coatings.
Id. at 83-84; accord Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1275 (2d
Cir. 1971).
79. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
80. Id. at 524. In Tumey the judge was paid a percentage of the traffic fines imposed. Id.
at 520.
81. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148 (plurality opinion).
82. Steven J. Goering, Note, The Standard of Impartiality as Applied to Arbitrators by the
Federal Courts and Codes of Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 821, 824 (1990).
83. Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto Salesmen's Union, Local 1095, 834 F.2d 751, 755-56 (9th
Cir. 1987), cer. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying a "reasonable
person" test of arbitrator bias); Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v. Anaconda Co., 418 F. Supp.
107, 110 (D.D.C. 1976) (applying fact-based bias test relying on Justice White's concurrence in
Commonwealth Coatings).
84. See, eg., Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (7th Cir.)
(applying appearance of bias test and then suggesting test was "objective" and "less exacting"
than that applied to judges), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980); United States Wrestling Fed'n
v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 317-19 (7th Cir. 1979); Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook
Indus., 495 F.2d 1260, 1263-65 (2d Cir. 1973).
85. See Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 433 F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating
that the Commonwealth Coatings decision reflects a "violation ... not of constitutional due
process but of a provision in the United States Arbitration Act").
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Perhaps because arbitrators are allowed to depart from substantive
law, few commercial cases reach the issue of the applicability of constitu-
tional rights within the arbitral setting. Assertions of labor arbitrators
that "even in the most informal of proceedings certain minimum require-
ments of 'due process' must be met if the award is to be legally bind-
ing"s86 are more relevant in labor arbitration where the concept of
"industrial due process"87 applies. Nonetheless, examination of the few
decisions that specifically address constitutional issues arising in arbitra-
tion yields valuable insight about the role of constitutional rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused
to require arbitrators to apply constitutional safeguards in Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, In 88 Stroh Container is a logical
starting point for analysis. The court of appeals refused to set aside a
commercial arbitration award and, by so doing, clearly rejected any re-
quirement of constitutional rights in arbitration:
The present day penchant for arbitration may obscure for many
parties who do not have the benefit of hindsight that the arbi-
tration system is an inferior system of justice, structured with-
out due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment
and rules of law.... No one ever deemed arbitration successful
in labor conflicts because of its superior brand of justice.89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
adopted the Stroh Container reasoning in Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook
& Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis.90 The Ellis decision rejected a claim that the
arbitrator's alleged refusal to consider evidence violated due process.
The Seventh Circuit found the hearing procedures "fair," cited the Stroh
Container dictum that arbitration procedures need not afford due pro-
cess, and reasoned that arbitration participants are bound by their con-
tractual choice of arbitration as an alternate means of dispute
resolution.91
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Todd Shipyards Corp. v.
Cunard Line, Ltd.,92 displayed a typical rejection of due process claims
86. RUSSELL A. SMITH ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION
212 (1st ed. 1970).
87. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
88. 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
89. Id. at 751 n.12 (emphasis added).
90. 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. at 268 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Graselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790
F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986)). The Ellis opinion flirts with the
proposition that the signatories to a valid arbitration clause waive any rights to due process.
For discussion of the waiver of rights concept, see infra notes 108-38 and accompanying text.
92. 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
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about the arbitration process. In Todd, Cunard sought to set aside the
one million dollar punitive damage arbitration award by arguing that the
arbitration procedures violated due process principles because of the nar-
row standard of review and "the absence of the rules of evidence." 93 The
court of appeals' refusal to set aside the award was premised upon the
parties' voluntary agreement to arbitrate and the appellant's full partici-
pation in the arbitration proceeding. Since the appellant agreed to arbi-
trate and took advantage of the arbitral process, "which it entered
voluntarily, [the appellant] cannot now argue that its due process was
denied."94
Despite these cases, commentators have opined that "[t]he [F]ifth
[A]mendment entitles all parties in arbitration proceedings to fundamen-
tally fair hearings." 95 There is little case authority, however, supporting
this proposition. Harvey Aluminum v. United Steelworkers96 did contain
assertions that arbitral participants "have the right to assume that any
arbitration hearing... will afford them the opportunity of presenting all
of their material evidence,"97 although this requirement appears to have
been premised upon the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) rather than upon constitutional doctrine. 98 Similarly, in Bell
Aerospace Co. Division of Textron v. Local 516,9 9 Judge Paul Hays, a
longtime critic of arbitration,"°° ruled that the arbitrator must, at a mini-
mum, "grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing." ' Judge Hays,
who would have been expected to base this "right" on as strong a ground
as possible, did not rely on the Constitution. Instead, he vaguely referred
to the requirement of judicial review of arbitral awards for failure to ad-
93. Id. at 1063.
94. Id. at 1064.
95. See, e.g., Douglas R. Davis, Note, Overextension ofArbitral Authority Punitive Dam-
ages and Issues ofArbitrability, 65 WASH. L. REv. 695, 706 (1990); accord, SMITH et al., supra
note 86, at 212 (suggesting that arbitrators must guarantee due process to make their results
legally binding).
96. 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
97. Id. at 492.
98. See id. at 492-93. Harvey Aluminum relied upon Rule 31 of the AAA rules and did
not refer to any constitutional provision.
99. 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. See generally PAUL N. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEw 116-18
(1966) (arguing that courts should not be used to enforce highly flawed labor arbitration
system).
101. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923. See also Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1275 (2d Cir. 1971) (Commonwealth Coatings required arbitrator disclo-
sure of financial dealings "as a matter of fundamental fairness"); Yates v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
501 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("Courts will set aside awards in which there is a
procedural impropriety which denies a party fundamental fairness.").
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mit relevant evidence in Section 10(c) of the FAA."0 2
Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union de Tronquistas Local 901 103 repre-
sents a similar refusal by a court to use due process violations to overturn
an arbitral award. In Hoteles Condado the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit aflfirmed a trial court order which set aside an award because the
arbitrator refused to consider the employer's evidence of employee
wrongdoing. The evidence consisted of a transcript of criminal proceed-
ings involving the same acts of alleged indecent exposure that had led to
the employee's discharge. Judge Wisdom's sole ground for affirming the
vacating of the award was the FAA's language authorizing vacating arbi-
tral awards for "refusal to hear evidence."'" The case law in general,
and Hoteles Condado Beach in particular, do not support the general
proposition that arbitrators must apply broad due process principles.
Hoteles Condado Beach signifies only that courts will use the FAA to
overturn awards where "the exclusion of relevant evidence 'so affects the
rights of a party that it may be said he was deprived of a fair
hearing.' t9os
Although arbitrators are not required to apply due process princi-
ples to commercial arbitration hearings, one cannot conclude that civil
liberties are completely foreign to such proceedings. The refusal of some
courts to incorporate constitutional rights into the arbitral setting is
predicated on the notion that courts should apply constitutional princi-
ples only when necessary. Cases requiring arbitrators to conduct a "fair
hearing,"1 6 although premised on the FAA, have due process overtones
that certainly impact on both the arbitrator and reviewing court. The
clearest ground for setting aside an arbitration award is blatant arbitrator
refusal to admit or consider evidence. One would expect how-to arbitra-
tor manuals to caution against any such tendency to exclude evidence,107
because a perception of fairness more likely will accompany the arbitral
hearing. This perception of fairness, however, is not a substitute for firm
application of a positivist set of constitutional rights. Little existing au-
thority supports the view that constitutional rights may be asserted either
in the arbitration hearing or as a ground for setting aside an arbitral
award.
102. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
103. 763 F.2d 34 (Ist Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 38.
105. Id. at 40 (quoting Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger
Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968)).
106. See Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923; Newark Stereotypers" 397 F.2d at 600; Harvey
Aluminum v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 493 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
107. See MURRAY et al., supra note 16, at 557 (warning that the "arbitrator is in fact far
more likely to get into trouble by excluding evidence than by admitting it").
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III. DEFENDING THE STATUS QUO: JUSTIFYING DENIALS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ARBITRATION
The vast majority of commercial arbitrators probably have not con-
sidered whether constitutional doctrines are applicable to arbitration
hearings. This section offers two reasons arbitrators fail to examine this
issue. First, the parties to a commercial arbitration sign a contract to
arbitrate and, therefore, expressly agree to a procedure with minimal
legal rights. According to this view, the parties have voluntarily waived
any constitutional rights. Second, the presence of constitutional doctrine
demands a governmental nexus or state action. A contract providing for
commercial arbitration seems to lack the requisite state action.
A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Contract to Arbitrate
The orthodox view holds that parties who consent by contract to
arbitration expressly waive their constitutional rights. The parties opt
out of the judicial system with its rigid substantive rules. This view re-
lieves the arbitrator of any obligation to consider constitutional asser-
tions in the arbitration proceeding.
In order to assess properly the issue of waiver, it is helpful to ex-
amine the nature of written agreements to arbitrate and the process of
executing an arbitration clause. The primary provider of arbitration
services, the AAA, recommends the following as an arbitration clause in
commercial agreements:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this con-
tract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled in accordance with
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered
in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.108
Many contracts use this boilerplate language. The arbitration clause is
broad because it calls not only for arbitration of disputes involving the
contract terms, but also of any disputes occurring as a result of the
contract. 109
Of course, parties are free to fashion their own arbitration clauses
and often do so with varying degrees of specificity.110 An arbitration
108. Id. at 477.
109. Id. (warning that "departure from hallowed formulas may leave the door open to
idiosyncratic judicial rulings").
110. Whitmore Gray, Dispute Resolution Clauses: Some Thoughts on Ends and Means,
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Aug. 1984, at 12 (emphasizing ability of
the contracting parties to shape the nature of the arbitration process by adding specifics to the
arbitration clause).
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clause may only consist of a one sentence agreement to "arbitrate any
dispute arising out of this contract." Such simple language can lead to
disputes about whether the parties intended to arbitrate disputes involv-
ing post-contract behavior of the parties or only other disputes concern-
ing terms of their contract.11
At the other extreme, contracting parties may give considerable at-
tention to the arbitration clause. It is common for a particular arbitra-
tion clause to elaborate on arbitral procedures and to specify the scope of
future arbitrations." 2 While such clauses may risk future interpretative
problems,1 3 specific, customized contracts to arbitrate permit the parties
to chart their dispute resolution course. Parties who anticipate that fu-
ture disputes will be factually complicated may opt to use specific discov-
ery services or even to adopt the broad discovery rules of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Parties also may opt for no discovery whatso-
ever. The identity of the arbitrator may be agreed to by the parties. The
important characteristic of an arbitration clause is that, like other ele-
ments of the contract, the parties control their own destiny. They gener-
ally are free to construct any arbitration edifice desired.
Conspicuously absent from this brief description of arbitration
clauses is any reference to constitutional rights. Contracts to arbitrate
are normally silent regarding constitutional rights. The implications of
this silence are significant. In the classic "commercial arbitrations" be-
tween merchants of a particular trade, two contractual partners intelli-
gently contract to arbitrate.1 The use of arbitration by New York
textile industry firms is illustrative. Often each firm is a repeat player
with arbitration experience and knowledge. In this context, supporters
of the "classic view" are correct that a contract to arbitrate just refers to
111. See, ag., Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163, 1168 (8th
Cir. 1984) (finding that part of a dispute between brokerage firm and former employee was not
arbitrable as dispute "arising out of employment or the termination of employment"); Bowmer
v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 291,406 N.E.2d 760, 761, 428 N.Y.S.2d 902, 904 (1980) (rejecting
claim that support dispute is arbitrable after parties sign arbitration clause agreeing to arbitrate
"any claim, dispute or misunderstanding arising out of or in connection with this Agreement,
or any breach hereof, or any default in payment").
112. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 33 (arguing that the "ambiguity of the existing arbitra-
tion and mediation discovery rules" justifies the incorporation of specific discovery provisions
or rules into arbitration clauses); Gray, supra note 110, at 12.
113. See MURRAY et al., supra note 16, at 477 (cautioning that "more detailed clauses are
likely to invite litigation over arbitrability").
114. See Robert L. Bonn, The Predictability of Nonlegalistic Adjudication, 6 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 563, 565-76 (1972) (discussing arbitration among textile merchants experienced in arbi-
tration); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York- A Brief
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 210 (tracing history of arbitration in the "mercantile com-
munity"); Mentschikoff, supra note 10, at 848-54 (discussing arbitration between merchant
members of a trade association).
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a form of dispute resolution with an informal but somewhat settled pro-
cedure. Law in general is de-emphasized and, instead, industry custom is
elevated. Signatories to the arbitration clause are well informed about
the meaning and nature of the arbitration process. The parties to the
arbitration clause understand that constitutional rights are not a part of
the typical arbitration process. To these experienced players, arbitration
means no legal rights, an expert decision maker, privacy, and speed.
Arbitration, however, has expanded far beyond the merchant con-
text. Today's contract to arbitrate may contain no more than the boiler-
plate AAA arbitration clause and involve one contractual partner who
has no prior arbitral experience or even no prior litigation experience. A
large volume of arbitration clauses are signed by laypersons without the
advice of counsel. The routine use of arbitration clauses in the securities
industry 15 means that new stock brokerage customers sign contracts to
arbitrate. The arbitration clauses are part of multi-clause, new-account
form contracts. These customers are likely to have no prior arbitration
experience. Consumer goods purchasers"1 6 and hospital patients' 17 sign
similar boilerplate arbitration clauses. In Professor Galanter's words,
they are "novices" or rookies in the dispute resolution business. 1 8
The implications of the word "arbitrate" in an arbitration clause are
vastly different when one party to the contract knows little or nothing
about arbitration. Courts should be reluctant to enforce automatically a
superficially consensual arbitration clause without examining carefully
the factual background and prior dispute resolution experience of the
parties. The arbitration agreement may be at most the general selection
of an out-of-court forum and include no precise reference to mutually
understood procedures. In particular, the rookie signatory to an arbitra-
tion clause may be unaware that signing the clause triggers an informal
proceeding in which potentially valuable legal rights are not available.
Arbitration clauses also have economic implications that are decep-
tively straightforward. Efficiency is furthered by agreements to exchange
115. See Barbara Franklin, Rewriting the Rules-Securities Arbitration: Claims Up; Proce-
dures Proposed, N.Y. L.L, Jan. 28, 1988, at 5, 5 (detailing routine use of arbitration clause to
resolve customer-broker disputes and increase in arbitration hearings); It's Rough Out There,
FORBES MAGAZINE, Dec. 26, 1988, at 85 (stating that "most brokers ask customers to sign
agreements sending disputes to arbitration").
116. The use of arbitration clauses in contracts to purchase new automobiles is increasingly
common. See BETrER BUSINESS BUREAU, AUTOLINE: A NATIONAL PROGRAM OF MEDIA-
TION/ARBITRATON FOR AUTOMOTIVE DISPUTES (1984).
117. Hospitals have inserted arbitration clauses into their admission forms. See infra notes
130-131 and accompanying text.
118. Marc Galanter, Why the "Halves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97 (1974).
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items because each party will receive a more useful item than it surren-
ders. 19 The improvements in individual welfare obtained by legally en-
forceable contracts are recognized by contract law. 2° Central to an
efficient exchange is a full understanding by each contractual partner of
the items traded. In the economist's terms, "perfect" or complete infor-
mation regarding the contract is essential to an efficient exchange. 2'
Of course, the exchange transaction involves costs to each party.
The contract will have to be negotiated, drafted, reviewed and, after exe-
cution, policed. The time and fees comprising these costs have an oppor-
tunity cost representing the return available on an identical alternative
investment. This package of costs is designated "transactions cost."'' 22
The transaction cost implications of arbitration clauses are noteworthy.
Because arbitration clauses are often part of "standard form" agree-
ments, they can be characterized as a tool designed to lower transaction
costs.123 The boilerplate AAA arbitration clause can be considered an
efficiency device designed to avoid the potentially high costs of a fully
negotiated, individualized arbitration clause. The fear of lengthy negoti-
ations about discovery issues, choice of arbitrators, or the use of substan-
tive law leads some firms to use boilerplate arbitration clauses.
This efficiency argument assumes perfect information, minimal ne-
gotiating costs, and minimal transaction costs. While these are plausible
assumptions for the purpose of analysis, they do not always exist in a real
world setting. Consider a new brokerage firm customer who desires to
purchase securities. She is handed a standard form contract containing a
boilerplate arbitration clause. The brokerage firm is a repeat player fa-
miliar with the costs and benefits of arbitration compared with conven-
tional litigation. This firm understands that arbitration results are likely
to be more predictable than the jury awards available in court. In addi-
119. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing
that voluntary exchanges transfer resources "from less to more valuable uss").
120. Id. at 83 (stating that contract law is "a handmaiden of exchange").
121. See S.A. Ozga, Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge, 74 Q.J. EON. 29
(1960).
122. See JoINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., 1sT SEss., Contracting Cost and Public Policy,
THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: THE PPB SYSTEM 167, 169
(Comm. Print 1969) (Harold Demsetz) (transaction costs include "the costs of search and
negotiation in the market place and the cost of insuring that voluntary agreements are
honored"); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (transaction
costs must include every aspect of a contract); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937) ('costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for
each exchange transaction... must also be taken into account"); George Stigler, The Econom-
ics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
123. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. &
EcON. 461, 462 (1974).
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tion, the firm wants a printed form arbitration clause to avoid or discour-
age expensive transactions costs and to lower the possibility of future
disputes.124 By contrast, the new customer is a dispute resolution rookie
unfamiliar with the nature of arbitration. We can assume that many cus-
tomers will simply sign the contract without discussing the meaning of
arbitration. Other customers may ask a question or two regarding the
arbitration clause. A few knowledgeable individuals may feel strongly
about giving up potential court redress and seek a new account with a
competitor firm not mandating arbitration. Perfect information will not
exist for the rookie signatory. Indeed, we can speculate confidently that
only a few customers realize that signing the arbitration clause specifi-
cally waives constitutional rights during arbitration. In short, efficiency
is frustrated by holding a rookie signatory to the terms of the standard,
new account agreement with the brokerage firm.
Nonetheless, a typical court will enforce this hypothetical arbitra-
tion clause.125 Few courts ever strike down arbitration clauses for lack of
assent or adhesive grounds. 126 The individual consumer's theoretical
ability to seek preferable alternative forms of dispute resolution with
competing firms or to bargain with the brokerage firm about the arbitra-
tion option prevents traditional courts from ready employment of "adhe-
sion contract" doctrine.
Judicial hostility to avoiding arbitration because of an adhesion ar-
gument is consistent with the economist's classic defense to the form con-
tract. Faced with potentially unfavorable terms, the consumer should
"shop around" with competitor firms for preferable alternatives. Such
reasoning might be an acceptable course of action if the costs of this
"shopping" were minimal, if competitive alternative terms without an
arbitration clause or with a dickered, improved arbitration clause were
124. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of-Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) (growing use of standardized mass contract is "inev-
itable" efficiency device used by informed bargainers to avoid future risks).
125. See, eg., Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J., 426 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (re-
quiring arbitration and specifically rejecting contention that a failure to read or assent particu-
larly to arbitration clauses in a contract can avoid operation of the arbitration clause);
Southern Tile v. Commercial Constr. Co., 548 So.2d 47, 48-49 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding
validity of a signed acknowledgment of goods document containing an arbitration clause be-
cause of plaintiff's duty to read); Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 876, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74,
76 (1970) (failing to understand non-neutral nature of arbitration will not avoid result of
arbitration).
126. See generally Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of
Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REv. 947, 991-93 (1972) (suggesting
that while courts will analyze arbitration clauses for assent using "adhesion" doctrine, results
of decisions indicate that the arbitration clauses will be upheld).
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available, and if a rookie consumer understood the meaning of the arbi-
tration clause. Of course, these assumptions do not comport with reality.
Competition among brokerage firms, which should theoretically
protect the interests of even the rookie arbitration clause signatory, does
not in fact do so. Professor Goldberg reasons that other rival firms are
unlikely to react competitively to a particular standard form contract
because "few, if any, customers will perceive the existence of variations
in terms."' 12 7 Moreover, the brokerage firm can easily "renegotiate the
terms for the few aggressive customers while keeping the high informa-
tion barrier for other customers virtually intact."12
To be sure, some courts are unwilling to enforce signed arbitration
clauses executed under particularly egregious circumstances. An arbitra-
tion clause may not be enforced if it is offered by a stronger party to a
weaker, rookie signatory on a "take it or leave it" basis. 129 For example,
in Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County,13 0 the court found ad-
hesive and unconscionable a standard form contract to arbitrate an em-
ployment dispute. Similarly, in Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital,3' the
court refused to enforce an "arbitration option" clause in a printed form
contract presented to hospital admittees. The contract was signed with-
out having been read by an incoming patient suffering from a "coronary
insufficiency." No procedures existed to alert the patient to the arbitra-
tion clause. 132
Nonetheless, few courts are willing to reject arbitration clauses on
adhesion contract grounds. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to
ignore the relevance of a contract signature because it represents volun-
tary assent to the terms of a contract. Judge Learned Hand reasoned
that "[a] man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he
does not." 133 Usually a court will be reluctant to reject an arbitration
clause on adhesive grounds because there is "no unfairness in expecting
127. Goldberg, supra note 123, at 485.
128. Id. (discussing customizing a few standard form contracts as a form of "contract term
discriminat[ion]").
129. See generally Kessler, supra note 124, at 631-38 (discussing standardized contracts
and their effect on the "weaker" party); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1173-84 (1983) (suggesting that form terms in an
adhesion contract should be presumptively unenforceable).
130. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910
(1982).
131. 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (1976).
132. Id. at 349-51, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 778-80.
133. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849 (1947); see also Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1056, 1064
(9th Cir. 1991) (enforcing arbitration award and rejecting argument that arbitration proce-
dures violated due process because parties entered into agreement to arbitrate "voluntarily").
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parties to read contracts before they sign them." '34
This judicial endorsement of arbitration clauses usually precludes
assertion that signatories to an arbitration clause did not validly waive
their constitutional rights. The present law governing waiver of constitu-
tional rights in civil cases is particularly tepid in its protection of civil
liberties. Unlike the rigorous Warren Court criminal standard requiring
waiver to be "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action," '135 the present threshold for waiving civil constitu-
tional rights seems to be that the waiving party only have satisfied con-
tract law principles. 136 In essence, a waiver can validly relinquish civil
constitutional rights if no principle of contract is violated.
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute 137 illustrates the Supreme Court's re-
luctance to scrutinize carefully consumer contracts for possibly adhesive
agreements to arbitrate. Shute required judicial enforcement of a choice-
of-forum clause contained on a cruise ticket. Despite the fact that the
purchasers of the cruise ticket were clearly at a disadvantage with respect
to bargaining power, the Shute Court failed to conduct a proper adhesion
contract analysis and rigidly held the parties to the boilerplate ticket lan-
guage. Shute has particular significance for arbitration because of the
relationship between choice-of-forum and arbitration clauses: "[A]n ar-
bitration clause is a form of forum selection clause."' 13 8
Shute seems to make it easy to waive significant civil liberties in the
process of contracting. Provided that a business using contracts contain-
ing a boilerplate arbitration clause has not acted unconscionably or adhe-
sively and meets the assent requirement, the arbitration clause is likely to
pass muster under the present standard for waiving civil constitutional
rights.
134. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1988) (enforc-
ing arbitration of dispute between investor and stock brokerage firm despite attack that bro-
kers "fraudulently induced" signing of clause by failing to disclose the meaning and effect of an
arbitration clause).
135. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) (explaining that an effective waiver requires "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right").
136. See generally Rubin, supra note 8, at 516-18 (reading D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), as requiring only that a
civil waiver meet contractual standards).
137. 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527-28 (1991).
138. John M. Kirby, Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum Selec-
tion Clause in Carnival Cruise Line v. Shute, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 888, 897 n.87 (1992) (" 'An
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in
resolving the dispute.' ") (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
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B. The Requisite State Action Nexus in Commercial Arbitration
Any contention that constitutional rights exist in arbitration runs
the risk of summary rejection because of the absence of state action. Ac-
cording to the majority view, a contract to arbitrate is a consensual trans-
action agreeing to no governmental involvement in resolving a dispute.
Viewed in this light, a contract to arbitrate is essentially a private trans-
action having no connection to the state. Accordingly, arbitrators need
not consider constitutional rights because state action is lacking.
This argument, while syllogistically attractive, must be analyzed in
light of the comprehensive arbitral enforcement machinery of the FAA
and similar state legislation. The FAA makes arbitration clauses effica-
cious by making valid arbitration clauses enforceable in federal court. 13 9
Three procedural subsections are important to an understanding of the
FAA. The legislation empowers federal courts to force or compel arbi-
tration' 4° and to stay pending litigation until arbitration is concluded.141
It also provides that a court can enforce an award by "confirming" it.142
These three complementary provisions create a system whereby arbitra-
tion clauses are presumed valid and are judicially enforceable. Under the
FAA, courts facilitate arbitration by forcing parties to honor arbitration
clauses and by making awards equivalent to court judgments. Although
the FAA is not a jurisdictional statute,143 state courts play a similar en-
forcement role because most states have arbitration legislation calling for
state courts to compel arbitration, to confirm awards, and to stay litiga-
tion until arbitration is complete. 144
To say that the FAA has received hospitable treatment by the courts
during the 1980s would be an understatement. During this period the
Supreme Court sent repeated signals to lower courts emphasizing the
139. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (providing that a written arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract"); see Leslie M. Gillin, Comment, A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Pro-
vide Adequate Protection for Aged Employees?, 35 VILL. L. REv. 389, 402 (1990) ("The pri-
mary objective of the FAA is to enforce arbitration provisions in commercial contracts.").
140. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
141. Id. § 3.
142. Id. § 9.
143. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1984) (holding that FAA does not
create "independent subject matter jurisdiction"); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 125 n.32 (1983); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Tril-
ogy: The Federalization ofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1341 (1985) (explaining that
actions to force arbitration, to confirm awards, or to stay pending litigation must have an
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction).
144. See, eg., UNIFoRM ARBrrATION AcT §§ 1 & 11, 7 U.L.A. 5, 133 (1955) (providing
state judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses and judicial confirmation of prior arbitral
awards). The UAA has been adopted in thirty-four states. See 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1989).
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FAA's expansive coverage. Despite a limited legislative history which
seemingly limits the FAA's purpose to providing federal court enforce-
ment of arbitration awards and agreements, 145 the Court has viewed the
FAA as preempting any provisions of state arbitration legislation that
discourage, frustrate, or prevent arbitration. In Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing,1" the Court held that the FAA preempted a California Franchise
Investment Act provision voiding agreements to arbitrate in franchisee-
franchisor transactions. 147 Professor Hirshman describes the broad
Southland preemption decision as "displac[ing] all state law limiting ar-
bitration."1 8 The FAA's preemptive effect was reaffirmed by the Court
in Perry v. Thomas. 149 The Pery Court found unconstitutional a provi-
sion of California's labor law that permitted suits to collect unpaid wages
"without regard to any private agreement to arbitrate. '1 50
The favorable judicial construction of the FAA extends beyond the
Act's important preemptive effect. During the 1980s the Supreme Court
reconstrued the FAA to require arbitration of statutory claims formerly
thought not to be subject to arbitration. The Court interpreted the FAA
to mandate arbitration of antitrust claims between international trading
partners,' claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,152 claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act' 53 and claims under the Securities Act of 1933.54 In
Shearson/American Enterprises, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court noted a
145. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Drayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REv. 265, 277-78 (1926) ("The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in
the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests solely
upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts."); Speidel, supra
note 5, at 168-69.
146. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
147. Id at 10-16; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1987). This provision, which voids
"any condition... bind[ing] any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any
provision of this law," was interpreted by the California Supreme Court to bar arbitration of
claims brought under the legislation. Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 Cal.
3d 584, 598-602, 645 P.2d 1192, 1202-04, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367-70 (1982), appeal dismissed
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
148. Hirshman, supra note 143, at 1350. Professor Hirshman theorizes that the impact of
Southland is so great that state law defenses to formation of the arbitration clause will be
preempted. Id.
149. 482 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1987).
150. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1987).
151. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-40
(1985).
152. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987).
153. Id. at 238-42.
154. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-85 (1989).
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"'federal policy favoring arbitration' ,15 and found an earlier "mistrust
of arbitration" misplaced." 6 Similarly, the increasingly pro-arbitration
attitude of the Supreme Court was evident in Rodriguez De Quuas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., in which the Court observed that a
prior " 'old judicial hostility to arbitration' " had undergone a process of
erosion,"' and described the FAA as mandating rigorous enforcement of
arbitration. 158
The 1980s also saw a contraction of the relatively modest form of
judicial review granted by Section 10 of the FAA. The anti-review atti-
tude of judges was expressed by Judge Posner who, in affirming a trial
court's refusal to set aside an arbitral award, observed that "this court
has been plagued by groundless lawsuits seeking to overturn arbitration
awards.... [W]e have said repeatedly that we would punish such tactics,
and we mean it." ' 9
This pro-arbitration attitude of the courts has created a potent en-
forcement machinery for private arbitral awards. Arbitration enforce-
ment extends well beyond the level of court enforcement of restrictive
racial covenants found objectionable in the landmark Shelley v. Krae-
mer 1 decision. In Shelley, the Supreme Court based its holding of ille-
gal discrimination on the ease of enforcing restrictive covenants in
court.1 61 The situation for arbitration agreements is analogous because
arbitration clauses would be ineffective without court orders compelling
arbitration, confirming awards, or staying court suits in order to force
arbitration. As with restrictive covenants, the availability of direct and
speedy court action enforcing arbitration agreements acts as a tool for
any arbitration clause signatory against anyone who dishonors the arbi-
tration agreement. Without the FAA and its pro-enforcement judicial
interpretation, agreements to arbitrate would be meaningless.
Characterizing a Shelley-type court enforcement as state action
could be criticized because the case has been interpreted as limited to its
facts. Modem commentators have not been kind to the Shelley state-
action analysis. Professor Kurland termed Shelley "constitutional law's
155. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
156. Id. at 233.
157. Rodriguez De Quqas, 490 U.S. at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
158. Id. at 480-481 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
159. Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987) (ending judicial
review of labor arbitration if court finds that arbitrator interpreted the collective bargaining
agreement).
160. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
161. Id. at 18-20.
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Finnegan's Wake," '162 and Professor Graglia railed that the Shelley rea-
soning was "disconcerting," conclusionary and mysterious. 163 In a
thoughtful essay on Shelley, Professor Allen stated that "[t]he principal
analytic weakness of the Shelley opinion may be its insistence on the
strict dichotomy between the making of restrictive agreements, which is
seen as wholly private, and the judicial enforcement of the covenants,
which is seen as public action." 164
The most positive characterization of the state-action decisions is
Laurence Tribe's opinion that the Court "has not succeeded in develop-
ing a body of state action 'doctrine'." 1 65 In defending the Shelley result,
Professor Allen stresses that, without governmental participation and aid
in the form of broad court enforcement, widespread restrictive covenant
use never would have occurred.1 66 According to this view, the govern-
ment did more than merely lend court enforcement to restrictive
covenants.
Professor Allen's interpretation of Shelley supports a state action
nexus in arbitration. More than mere court enforcement of essentially
private contracts is involved in arbitration by virtue of the FAA and Uni-
form Arbitration Act (UAA). The ability to obtain quick and routine
judicial stays of litigation in derogation of specific arbitration clauses de-
ters any arbitration signatory from instituting a court suit. The specific
availability of confirmation suits encourages parties to comply with the
results of arbitration hearings. The broad construction of the FAA rep-
resents a strong signal to the free market that facilitates and encourages
arbitration. The courts' need for arbitration as a docket clearing device
has created a mutually beneficial relationship between courts and the pri-
vate arbitration establishment. As it now stands, the modern interpreta-
tion of the FAA has created a federal delegation to private parties and
encourages them to resolve disputes in private at their expense in return
for easy and public court enforcement. In sum, a tenable argument for
162. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term-Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV.
143, 148 (1964).
163. Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 788
(1989).
164. Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private Worlds,
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 709, 725 (1989).
165. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1690 (2d ed. 1988).
In contrast, other scholars suggest the lack of a clear state action doctrine "has continued to
haunt constitutional adjudication and legal literature." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12.5, at 448 (3d ed. 1986).
166. Allen, supra note 164, at 726.
[Vol. 71
1992] ARBITRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 113
Shelley-style state action exists.167
Nonetheless, the recent contraction of the state-action doctrine
means an uphill fight for any argument that asserts that state action re-
quires application of constitutional rights during arbitration. The vague
concept of state action has been narrowed by the Supreme Court.16 8 The
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks 6 9 decision stands as a particularly trouble-
some obstacle. In Flagg Brothers, the Court rejected arguments that a
post-eviction sale of furniture permitted under the New York Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) constituted state action.170 The Court specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the state had delegated a "public func-
tion" of dispute resolution to the storage company that sold the
claimant's furniture.' 7 ' The Supreme Court found that an "exclusive"
role for the state did not exist because the UCC authorized alternative
modes of dispute resolution. 72
While Flagg Brothers represents a clear rejection of a broad state-
action doctrine, it can be distinguished from enforcement of arbitral
awards under the FAA. The terms of the FAA make private arbitration
awards enforceable in court. Without clear support from the state, pri-
vate arbitration would not be successful. Although this distinction seems
valid, the existing disfavor for broadened use of state action requires ex-
amination of other ways to incorporate increased standards of procedural
fairness in arbitration hearings.
IV. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SOURCES FOR INCREASED
SENSITIVITY TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ARBITRATION
In contrast to Section II's focus on the major roadblocks to court
application of constitutional rights to arbitration hearings, Section III
examines more promising non-constitutional sources that may permit
167. See also Leo P. Dreyer, Arbitration Agreements After Volt and Browning Ferris, 38
KAN. L. REv. 667, 721-22 (1990) (discussing constitutional defenses and "the existence of
state action in the imposition of punitive damages in private, consensual arbitration
proceeding.")
168. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (hold-
ing that NCAA is not a state actor in enforcing and making rules); San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546-47 (1987) (holding that
U.S. Olympic Committee is not a state actor despite apparent federal connections as a spon-
sor); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505 & n.10 (1985) (describing the Burger
Court's lack of willingness to subject private conduct to the Constitution).
169. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
170. Id. at 164-66.
171. Id. at 157-58.
172. Id. at 159-60.
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some constitutional protection in arbitration. This section first looks at
the intent and text of the FAA as a potential source for increased atten-
tion to constitutional rights. It then examines the inherent power held by
arbitrators as a possible means for enhancing constitutional protections.
A. The Text of the Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA is a simple and direct source of non-constitutionally based
procedural rights during arbitration. While this 1925 legislation does not
directly regulate arbitral procedure, its section on judicial review pro-
vides some degree of procedural protection and merits closer
examination.
Section 10(a)(1) of the FAA creates judicial power to vacate an
award "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.""'1v Most inter-
pretations of this subsection have focused on the "corruption" or "fraud"
language and pay scant attention to "undue means."1 4 One interpreta-
tion of "undue means" would read this phrase as a mere repetitive syno-
nym for the preceding words "fraud" and "corruption." This
interpretation would not provide any additional measure of constitu-
tional protection because it gives no independent significance to the
words "undue means."
In contrast, the phrase "undue means" could be read more expan-
sively but still consistently with its plain meaning. These words focus
clearly on procedure. They invite a court to examine arbitral procedure
broadly. In particular, the word "undue" could be expansive in scope.
The modem due process revolution has created a flexible "due" process
concept which depends on the factual context of the due process asser-
tion. 175 These cases read the word "due" in a pragmatic fashion: due
means appropriate process. The "due" or appropriate process a citizen
receives depends on the facts presented.
A plain meaning interpretation of section 10(a)(1)'s "undue means"
language would place in judicial hands the power to examine arbitral
awards for particularly egregious procedural irregularity. This construc-
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
174. See, eg., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988)
("perjury constitutes fraud" within meaning of§ 10(a)); Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 600 (3d Cir.) (proving perjury constituting fraud
will not cause award to be vacated unless fraud relates to actual core of dispute), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 954 (1968); Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1951)
(vacating arbitral awards reluctantly despite proof of perjury that constitutes fraud).
175. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.31, at 288-92 (3rd
ed. 1991) (using term "flexible due process"); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975) (devising procedures that are fair, feasible and followable when
affording due process under a myriad of circumstances).
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tion would require courts to examine private arbitrations for procedural
unfairness as a matter of interpreting the FAA rather than the Constitu-
tion. This argument, however, while appealing as a matter of statutory
construction, loses force when placed in the modern, pragmatic context
of arbitration. Because arbitral awards usually lack any findings or ex-
planation, 176 courts are prevented from review of the facts needed to pro-
vide an appropriate process definition of "undue means." Moreover, the
contemporary judicial attitude, which resists serious review of arbitral
awards, creates an uphill battle for this attractive plain-meaning con-.
struction of "undue means." Modern cases interpret the FAA as encour-
aging arbitration and discouraging judicial review of arbitral awards.177
A particularly strong reason for interpreting "undue means" in this man-
ner must arise before any increased judicial review can be expected.
A second FAA source of possible increased procedural protection is
section 10(a)(3), which allows an award to be vacated under the follow-
ing terms:
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.178
The italicized language potentially grants a court wide power to set aside
awards on discretionary grounds such as violation of an arbitral party's
"rights." The words "other misbehavior" are vague. They become espe-
cially powerful when considered in context; they follow instances of fail-
ure to postpone the hearing or to admit evidence. Certainly "other
misbehavior" must be procedural in nature and more than the mere ad-
mission of evidence.
The critical word in section 10(a)(3) is, however, "rights." At first
blush this word seems misplaced in arbitration because the informal na-
ture of arbitration usually means that the parties have no guaranteed
rights.17 9 In a situation where no rules of evidence or substantive rules
apply, how can Congress have chosen denials of "rights" as a ground for
176. See supra text accompanying note 11.
177. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1650 (1991) (sub-
jecting statutory claim brought under Age Discrimination in Employment Act to compulsory
arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (emphasizing the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" when deciding
issue of whether a statutory based claim is arbitrable); Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc.,
899 F.2d 410,413 (5th Cir. 1990) (commenting that"judicial review of an arbitration award is
extraordinarily narrow").
178. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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setting aside arbitral awards? The answer may be that Congress under-
stood the potential danger of a purely informal procedure and inserted
the word "rights" as a check on the powers of arbitrators. Moreover, the
plain meaning of the word "rights" logically could refer to constitutional
rights. Arguably, these rights are the most significant legal protection
that Congress seeks to safeguard by using the term "rights."
Strong historical evidence supports a judicial review function which
would examine an arbitration for serious procedural errors. The initial
drafter of the FAA was Julius Cohen.18 0 Cohen's interpretation of the
new Act was published in February, 1926, one month after the Act was
in force. 181 While Cohen cautioned that under the new legislation courts
should not lightly vacate arbitral awards, 82 his description of the legisla-
tion conveys a remarkably active role for the courts in preserving proce-
dural protections for the arbitral parties. Cohen actually referred to the
arbitral participants as possessing "rights": "[I]f arbitrators' awards are
subject to mistakes and other human frailties, as necessarily they must
be, it is obvious that review solely by a judge sitting at a motion term will
not suffice to safeguard the party whose rights will have been substantially
violated by the arbitrators."'8 3 This reference to "rights" explains the
power Congress gave courts to vacate arbitral awards for "prejudice" of
the "rights of any party" under Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA. Cohen
understood that there must be some room for serious judicial review
under the legislation because "to deny any right of appeal at all would be
to take away a most important privilege and safeguard without a com-
pensating gain. '
The role Cohen envisioned for courts must be placed in the context
of arbitration as it existed in 1925. Cohen saw the legislation as "di-
rected primarily toward settlement of commercial disputes."' 8 5 He envi-
sioned arbitration as a "remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the
ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact" and as hav-
180. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
HR. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1924) (testimony of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Com-
merce, Trade and Commercial Law, indicating that Cohen "has had charge of the actual draft-
ing of the work"); id. at 15 (testimony of Julius Cohen, indicating that he wrote first draft of
legislation).
181. Cohen & Drayton, supra note 145, at 265.
182. See, ag., id. at 268 (describing review powers of court in such a way as to reveal a
clear goal of arbitral finality); id. at 273 (discussing need to limit appeal from awards).
183. Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 265.
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ing a place "in the determination of the simpler questions of law." 186
Cohen's article describing the Act reveals an intent to devise a remedy
entirely for commercial disputes. This narrow scope of the FAA also is
evidenced by the FAA's legislative history, which makes reference to dis-
putes between "merchants." '
Cohen's vision of the FAA is a far cry from its contemporary appli-
cation to torts and disputes between businesses and consumers. Signifi-
cantly, Cohen viewed the new legislation as not setting forth a "proper
method for deciding points of law of major importance involving consti-
tutional questions or policy in the application of statutes," subjects he felt
were "better left to the determination of skilled judges."'88 Cohen's ex-
planation supports leaving questions of constitutional rights to the courts
for review following an arbitration and is compatible with an expansive
role for the courts in safeguarding rights.
B. The Inherent Powers of Arbitrators: Toward a Concept of
Commercial Due Process in Arbitration
Arbitrators have the power to safeguard fair procedure in an arbi-
tration hearing. They possess broad control over the nature of the arbi-
tral hearing and certainly can apply procedural norms that safeguard
rights. Because of the incredible scope of powers possessed by the arbi-
trator it is not necessary to pinpoint a precise legal source for applying
procedural protections. If the arbitrator is willing to apply rights of
some kind, her inherent powers provide a satisfactory basis of authority.
Strong policies support arbitrators' considering and applying proce-
dural rights without any prodding by the courts. First and foremost, the
application of fundamentally fair procedure is probably a goal of the par-
ties who have chosen to arbitrate. It would be a strange set of disputants
who would choose not to apply fair procedures.
Another important policy reason justifying increased arbitrator sen-
sitivity toward procedural rights is the need to preserve the integrity of
the arbitration process itself. At present, arbitration operates in a culture
where, as a matter of doctrine, no definite legal norms safeguard consti-
tutional rights. Arbitrations can be, and sometimes are, arbitrary. Ar-
186. Id. at 281.
187. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Federal Com-
mercial Arbitration.: Hearings on . 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923) (testimony of Mr. W.H.H. Piatt, indi-
cating that "[the legislation] is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it")
(emphasis added).
188. Cohen & Drayton, supra note 145, at 281.
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bitrators are supposed to be fair. This attribute is designed to appeal to
the arbitral parties. Enhanced procedural fairness is simply good for
arbitration.
The long tradition of arbitrator control over evidentiary matters
would support any decision by an arbitrator to permit the consideration
of constitutional agreement. Arbitrators possess the "discretionary
power to admit and hear any evidence that the parties may wish to pres-
ent."" 9 The high level of discretion given arbitrators regarding the ad-
mission of evidence1 90 is sensible because of the informality of
arbitration.
Accordingly, strong policies buttress an arbitrator's application of
procedural rights without any definite need to do so under either the
FAA or the Constitution. Enhanced application of procedural rights
should take place as a matter of arbitrator choice.
It is plausible that "commercial due process" will develop. This
concept would be commercial arbitration's equivalent of labor arbitra-
tion's doctrine of "industrial due process." While it is true that an occa-
sional court decision vacating an arbitral award due to procedural
unfairness would certainly influence arbitrators, the evolution of com-
mercial due process may occur as a matter of arbitrator initiative and not
because of external forces such as the courts or legislation. Two parties
with the common goal of solving a commercial problem probably desire
an element of fair procedure in their hearing. Particularly in those situa-
tions where parties have an ongoing business relationship, such as sup-
plier-customer or franchisor-franehisee, there is a need to make the
arbitration result seem fair and just in order to preserve the business as-
sociation. "Industrial due process" evolved in labor arbitration because
of its overall importance to ongoing labor relations and the need to pre-
serve harmony between labor and management. Similarly, application of
rough due process during a commercial arbitration will aid the chances
of the disputants considering one another as business associates. Refusal
to apply fairness principles in a commercial arbitration could prevent any
chance of a continuing relationship between the disputants.
It is unlikely that an arbitrator-initiated due process will evolve
from the increased use of non-commercial arbitration because the dispu-
189. WILNER, supra note 1, § 24.02, at 364.
190. See, eg., Companis Panemena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber
Co., 244 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1957) (restricting judicial review of arbitrator's evidentiary
rulings because review would cause "waste of time, the interruption of the arbitration proceed-
ing, and encourage delaying tactics"); Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exch., Inc., 292 F.
Supp. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Arbitrators must be given discretion to determine whether
additional evidence is necessary or would simply prolong the proceedings.").
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tants have no ongoing relationship. For example, arbitration of automo-
bile accident disputes among strangers provides no incentive for
preserving a continuing relationship among the disputants. Certainly ap-
plication of fair procedures in such an arbitration hearing has independ-
ent value. Nonetheless, the dynamic of an ongoing relationship, so
critical in the development of "industrial due process," will not spur the
arbitrator of a tort accident dispute to create harmony among the dispu-
tants by assuring a fair procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between constitutional rights and arbitration is un-
easy. Classical arbitration theory rejects the application of definite con-
stitutional rights in an arbitration hearing. Such rights would needlessly
judicialize what is supposed to be an informal process. Moreover, the
parties have opted out of the formal, judicial process by contracting to
arbitrate and have voluntarily removed any "state action" nexus which
would mandate the application of constitutional rights.
The classical view holds true when applied to parties who are exper-
ienced, repeat players in arbitration. Any argument of wholesale waiver
of procedural rights, however, which applies to all arbitration fails to
account for the explosive growth of arbitration. Arbitration has grown
into areas such as consumer purchases or consumer loans where rookie
signatories to arbitration clauses are unlikely to waive constitutional
rights intentionally or intelligently. The doctrine of waiver of constitu-
tional rights is, at this time, simply inadequate to explain the absence of
constitutional rights in all arbitration settings.
How can increased procedural protections find their way into both
the arbitration hearing and judicial review of arbitration awards? The
lack of a traditional basis of state action makes it improbable that courts
will mandate the application of constitutional rights. A much more at-
tractive legal ground is an historically accurate reading of the FAA
which requires courts to protect "rights" of arbitral parties. The FAA's
text provides a basis for vacating awards obtained by "undue means" and
to safeguard "the rights" of parties to an arbitration. To date, courts
have largely ignored these phrases, perhaps because of a general feeling
that courts should avoid review of arbitral awards.
The best way to enhance the application of procedural fairness in
arbitration is to examine the arbitrator's reasons to incorporate proce-
dural fairness into the arbitration process. In the field of labor arbitra-
tion, "industrial due process" has arisen because of the need to give labor
arbitration integrity and to preserve on-going relationships between labor
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and management. There is reason to believe that similar conditions
could cause commercial arbitrators to be increasingly sensitive to fairness
concerns when hearing a dispute between parties who may have a contin-
uing relationship. "Commercial due process" may be the method by
which constitutional rights begin to permeate commercial arbitration.
Nonetheless, in the increasing amount of tort-based arbitration, arbitra-
tors are unlikely to find pressure to increase fairness protections. In these
cases, no ongoing or continued association binds the disputants and some
alternative reason will be needed to guarantee the preservation of proce-
dural rights in what is, after all, a type of judicial process, arbitration.
